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Book Reviews 
Deconstructive Criticism: An Advanced Introduction by Vincent B. Leitch, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1983). Pp. xiii + 290. $25.00, Cloth; $8.95 
paper. 
Deconstructive Criticism should prove a useful, if not indispensable, tool in 
helping to inform American students and many academics about post-struc-
turalism, the latest phase of continental thought to influence literary studies 
here and abroad. Although it is regrettable that a provincialism in the En-
glish-speaking academy of criticism maintains defenses against alien styles of 
thinking and writing, Vincent Leitch commendably accommodates his audi-
ence by taking little for granted. Ultimately, any evaluation of the book's 
achievement does need to consider the question of the audience for whom 
this "advanced introduction" is intended, but for the moment I want to sin-
gle out its merits purely as an account of what has come to be called decon-
structionism. Deconstructive Criticism is a reliable guide to the major thinkers 
of a loosely federated project pieced together largely out of idiosyncratic texts 
by Martin Heidegger, Jacques Lacan, Claude Levi-Strauss, Michel Foucault, 
Jacques Derrida, and Roland Barthes. With American students and critics in 
mind, Leitch also chronicles the rival ways in which some prominent North 
American critics appropriate post-structuralist techniques: Hayden White, 
Paul de Man, the later J. Hillis Miller, Joseph Riddel, William Spanos, and 
Paul Bove. Leitch completes his account of this disestablishment of American 
formalism by showing how two members of the so-called Yale school, Har-
old Bloom and Geoffrey Hartman, are indebted to deconstructive grounds for 
the independent positions they have taken beside them. 
Leitch manages his expository tasks without extreme simplification or dis-
tortion, the major figures not only surviving summary but taking their places 
in a coherent historical account. Leitch shapes his history of deconstruction 
around the theme of sign-theory. In the Course in General Linguistics, Ferdi-
nand de Saussure calls for a mode of cultural and discursive analysis based 
on his theory that language is not a storehouse of sounds produced by their 
anterior meanings but a system of articulated differences. The sign is consti-
tuted by an arbitrary bonding of signifier (the sound image) and the signified 
(the designated concept). The legacy of Saussure's new discipline, which he 
proposes to call "semiology," eventually issues in the revisionisms of Lacan 
in psychoanalysis, Levi-Strauss in anthropology, and Barthes in literary anal-
ysis. In each case the differential nature of the sign figures to reformulate the 
methods of analysis: Lacan breaks a Saussurian path into Freud by grasping 
that the Unconscious is bound to conscious discourse through an arbitrary 
(not natural) link, a situation that voids the Unconscious as a repository of 
accessible ·truth. Instead, the analytic discourse must be taken as a floating 
signifier that can only refer to another system of difference; the Unconscious 
is already lithe whole structure of language and its dreamwork follows the 
laws of the signifier" (p. 12). Likewise, Levi-Strauss analyzes cultural prac-
tices structurally through elements whose significance inheres in symbolic 
oppositions. And Barthes, in his early writings, propounds a literary structur-
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alism that concentrates upon the opposition of textual signs rather than upon 
the realistic or philosophical offices of literature. Leitch first demonstrates 
how structuralism realizes the Saussurian sign so that he can identify what 
the "post" marks in post-structuralism. For against Saussure's semiology 
Derrida calls for a grammatology, a science that appreciates the bar yoking 
signifier and signified more radically. Derridean deconstruction ism challenges 
the place of structure, the signified, and presence in the structuralist enter-
prise by insisting that the differential nature of language (what Derrida calls 
the general structure of writing) already prevents the straight fe-presentation 
of idea, structure, or personal presence in a text. The differential unity of sig- (, 
nitied and signifier means that concepts exist only as they are bound to their : .• \'!;, 
material images in a system of signs. My rehearsal of these commonplaces 
intends to illustrate how the unity of Leitch's introduction arises from its em-
phasis on a main question that a range of eccentric, difficult writers take up. :1' 
Throughout his explanations, Leitch maintains the "sympathetic stance i\: 
toward deconstruction" identified in his preface (p. xii). He is neither a blind i:1 
partisan, nor a messenger of alarm, nor a theorist crowding his own subject. )11· 
As a result, Leitch avoids disappearing into transparent exposition at the I 
same time he keeps clear of the kind of engagement that ruins some other ,., 
accounts of recent theory: one thinks of Dennis Donoghue's hysteria, Robe,'~ '~ 
Scholes's impassioned theologization, and even, to a lesser extent, Jonathan 
Culler's instant (however brilliant) judgment of the worth of new theories. 
Deconstructive Criticism incurs a number of risks in undertaking to summa-
rize the ideas of writers who deny a text's p'Jwer to convey ideas, and to de-
scribe criticism inspired by writers who challenge the very possibility of 
criticism. Leitch understands these difficulties, but his book confronts them 
unevenly at best. One problem for a description of deconstructive theory has 
its ancestor in American formalism: paraphrase is still heresy. For Leitch, the 
difficulty might be illustrated in his treatment of Derrida. In order to explain 
the Derridean notion of differance, Leitch concentrates on the absolute differ-
ence between the acoustic image and its referent: we use the word for a thing 
because the thing is absent (in experience, as we speak; in the text, as we 
write). But this is scarcely the main thrust of Derrida's point (or even Saus-
sure's), since difference, more profoundly, is the very structure of language 
and thought. Words mean because they differ arbitrarily from other words, 
not because they are tied to an object reflected in the word; likewise, differ-
ence permits the articulation of mental constructs and images, which signify 
because they are differentiated in a system. Differance suggests that the ideal 
concept is never 'there' except as bound to the graphic image. Moreover, the 
concept of deferment, which Derrida also intends by coining differance, does 
not suggest simply the perpetual postponement of some object itself in the 
text (as if we might look for literal limbs of a body to spill out of the pages of 
Pynchon's V.). Differance names the motions by which a text's nature as writ-
ing inescapably subverts the solidification of idea, insight, and even terminol-
ogy. Derrida's analysis works most insistently within the tissues of the text, 
not, as Leitch may imply, between the text and the world of objects. Leitch 
undoubtedly knows all this very well, but the constraints of paraphrase 
sometimes force simplification. 
Some readers will be put off by Leitch's efforts to preserve the flavors of 
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eccentric styles in his own prose: his occasional effusiveness and portentious-
ness seem calculated to capture strains of the apocalyptic in Barthes, Derrida, 
Foucault; his punning to ape the tense compression of Derrida's playfulness 
or the seductive luxuriation of Barthes; his high toned aphorisms to echo the 
enigmatic proclamations of Lacan; his preference for a scientific, passive 
voice to approximate Foucault. I take Leitch's efforts here as one element in a 
strategy designed to overcome the intractabilities of texts that simply must be 
read in order to be possessed. 
Beyond successive generations of advanced undergraduates or beginning 
graduate students, Leitch's audience is a problematic one, for one would not 
want companion books like this to be read in the place of the original works. 
Too many American critics have preferred to remain ignorant of the theoreti-
cal tradition that culminates in post-structuralism-whether because of the 
sheer amount to be assimilated belatedly, or the rumored subversive implica-
tions of the newer higher criticism, or some Oedipal deafness to the passions 
of the next generation. Whatever the reasons they go unread, the writers 
whom Leitch wants to "introduce" repay attention, and, of course, they are 
being read increasingly. The stature of figures like Lacan, Heidegger, and 
Levi-Strauss in the course of twentieth century thought seems simply 
unquestionable. We have, purely as intellectuals, the obligation to acquaint 
0urselves with their work, whether we license their effect on criticism or not. 
We all read Freud or Marx even if we are strict formalists. Moreover, as the 
popular media's attention suggests (in images like that 6f the trenchcoated 
Monsieur Jacques Derrida peering out at the readership of Newsweek), the 
struggle between the new and newer criticism is a point of interest and in-
quiry for a society that trivializes literature and literary study. We are a riven 
profession, and perhaps Deconstructive Criticism will do its part to promote 
conversation among ourselves and with the larger world. For the well in-
formed, this book will seem decidedly belated, a presentation of methods al-
ready being modified. For others more lately come, the book might still seem 
1. little beside the point, since we are deluged with translations of most of 
these writers and with well edited and introduced anthologies in which even 
the faint of heart may take their deconstruction in shorter draughts. But for 
others who want a general map of the historical development of post-struc-
turalism, and who want a chart for their reading of its authors, Decol1structive 
Criticism will be a welcome guide. 
Boston University John T. Matthews 
The Poetics of Authority 
Poetic Authority: Spenser, Milton, and Literary History by John Guillory. New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1983. Pp. xiii + 201. $25.00, cloth; $12.50, 
paper. 
Self-Crowned Laureates: Spenser, Jonson, Milton and the Literary System by 
Richard Helgerson. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California 
Press, 1983. Pp. x + 294. $22.00. 
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"What conditions did Linnaeus (or Petty, or Arnauld) have to fulfill," 
Michel Foucault asked some time ago in The Order of Things, "not to make 
his discourse coherent and true in general but to give it, in the time it was 
written and accepted, value and practical application as scientific discourse 
... ?"I Although cast in terms of eighteenth-century natural philosophy, 
economics, and grammar, Foucault's question addresses the historical condi-
tions of possibility for any given discourse; appropriately translated into the 
realm of literature, it is a question that should properly concern any literary 
history-at least, as Frank Lentricchia has recently argued, insofar as it en-
deavors to be genuinely historical: 2 
What this means for the writing of literary history is that the historian 
will be loath to isolate giants like Milton for English poetry or Emerson 
for the American scene Milton or Emerson will be convenient 
names only for the focusing of convergences of force which no au-
thorial will (including those of Milton or Emerson) can control or even 
hope to be conscious of. Awareness of the numerous subindividual 
marks imprinted on authors by an impressive discursive formation (as 
well as by a subtle and potentially life-denying lineage) will encourage 
the historian to cease looking in the distant past for a single heavy-
weight father-figure as the sole determinant of a given literary identity, 
will encourage him to start looking closer to home, at numerous forgot-
ten contemporaries whose sense of the poetic mayor may not corre-
spond with that of the emerging identity in question .... The result of 
such a reorientation of historical method would be an emphasis on 
both lineage and differences and a perspective that the literary self as 
synthesis "is an unstable assemblage of faults, fissures, and heteroge-
neous types;" such a perspective would view the literary self as the 
product of the "hazardous play of dominations" -some of them not at 
all "literary." 
Although literary history in its traditional guises has accomplished much, 
even at its most rigorous the consideration of an issue like poetic authority 
has been limited, insofar as the conditions of poetic discourse have been de-
fined as strictly literary. The reorientation Lentricchia describes would result 
in the study of poetic authority as a more broadly determined cultural artifact 
-one produced not by the intersection of tradition and the individual talent, 
but by a complex negotiation between shifting fields of social and cultural 
forces. 
It is poetic authority in the strictly literary sense of the phrase that John 
Guillory examines in his recent study of Spenser and Milton. Guillory's ver-
sion of literary history-"poets talking and listening to one another" (68)-
places his Poetic Authority well within the confines of traditional literary his-
tory; his emphasis on imagination as the ambivalent source of poetic power 
and autonomy further serves to identify the degree to which Romanticism, 
and critical theory developed from it, has determined his perspective on the 
Renaissance. A quite different view of the conditions and limits of poetic dis-
course in the period is offered in Richard Helgerson's Self-Crowned Laureates. 
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Although the question Helgerson asks of his authors is akin to Foucault's, it 
has also been fully translated into the historical context of early modern liter-
ature. The result is not a study of poetic authority per se but a broader cul-
tural analysis that might be characterized as the poetics of authority: in this 
instance, a wide-ranging study of successive generations of sixteenth- and 
seventeenth-century English poets-Spenser, Jonson, Milton, and their re-
spective contemporaries-and of the literary, social, and political pressures 
which, in combination, served both to authorize and to limit the roles avail-
able to ambitious poets of each generation. Thus while these two studies 
share authors and what appears to be a common theme, they in fact have lit-
tle ground in common. Informed as they are by radically incompatible as-
sumptions about history, literary and otherwise, they could be said to 
represent-matters of relative success and critical acumen aside-distinct and 
even opposed developments in current Renaissance studies. 
II 
John Guillory "describes an end and a beginning: the end of inspiration 
and the beginning of imagination" (ix) as the ground of poetic authority, Al-
though Spenser and Milton occupy a period of hiatus "between the birth, 
of a putative 'secular' text, and the later triumph of the imagination," what is 
dying, what being born, and how, is difficult to say: 
This study describes an end and a beginning: the end of inspiration 
and the beginning of imagination. However, I do not identify this be-
ginning with the origin of the secular text, or this end with the end of 
the sacred text. My hypothesis is that the authority of the imagination 
(which is almost never questioned by post-Renaissance critics) is com-
pletely implicated in the efflorescent death of inspiration; and this 
death, paradoxically, makes possible the survival of "scripture," always 
at the end of its era. The continuance of scripture is what we must now 
try to understand, as it is finally more important than the event an-
nounced in literary history as the internalization of the muse. (ix) 
What "completely implicated" is meant to convey in the passage above is left 
to the reader's ingenuity, but certain aspects of Guillory's argument can 
nonetheless be summarized with relative clarity. 
Guillory's interest in Spenser and Milton lies in their resistance to the in-
creasing secularization of the text-a resistance to "writing that is not, in ef-
fect, scriptural" -and in the paradoxical effects of that resistance on the 
history of English literature, He is struck by the fact that "the post-Miltonic 
imagination no ~onger names an exclusively secular origin ... but a further 
remystification of the same imagination" (ix) that Spenser and Milton polem-
icized against. Their polemics against it are "fundamentally a consequence of 
anxiety about authority" (177); their resistance to this authority of the imagi-
nation "as a mode ·of self-begetting." cast as it was in a "regressive" recourse 
to divine inspiration, served to produce that '''line' of poetry descending 
from Spenser and Milton" which, while grounded in the powers of the imag-
ination, was also "aggressively scriptural" (viii). It is this" 'line'" of poetry-
primarily the Romantic tradition, especially Wordsworth, and always in quo-
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tations-that Poetic Authority seeks to account for, and defines as a belated 
struggle "to produce a poetic text that is both original and sacred" (16). 
After a brief survey of Renaissance concepts of imagination and inspira-
tion, Guillory turns to Spenser and Milton's related (and equally belated) 
struggle against "the secular itself, or the established authority of Renaissance 
literature" (21). The passing recognition of some complexity in period atti-
tudes toward imitation, imagination, and inspiration is quickly forgotten, 
since the "established" authority of Renaissance literature is hereafter treated 
as if it were grounded in claims for the imagination as an autonomous poetic 
power: a curious view of Renaissance literature, Spenser and Milton's 
perspective on it, and Guillory's own (more rigorous) sources.3 Spenser and 
Milton conduct their struggle with this established authority by trying to dis-
place certain of their precursor poets-Ovid and Shakespeare, respectively. 
Although Guillory has clearly modelled his "interior literary history ... writ-
ten tropologically" (131) on the revisionary poetics of Harold Bloom, he 
would claim the status of a revisionist himself. He has, he tells us, replaced 
the concept of literary influence with what he calls "the concept of acknowl-
edgement." Furthermore, the figures displaced by Spenser and Milton are to 
be understood as allegorical figures of the imagination, rather than as poetic 
egos in Bloom's sense. Their presence can be identified whenever they are 
openly named, or alluded to, or echoed: 
I am interested in those maneuvers of invocation and recognition by 
which an author becomes an auctor. Poets certainly do confront each 
other as psyches in the course of literary history, as the notion of influ-
ence proposes, but these disembodied egos are also to be conceived as 
allegorically laden figures of prosopopeia. If the critical or climactic 
moments in the careers of my two poets are often those in which an 
auctor is acknowledged ... these first-order phantasms conceal behind 
their empty sleeves other more spectral sources (Ovid for Spenser, 
Shakespeare for Milton) who in turn gesture toward the groundless ori-
gin, the imagination itself. By deferring, in particular, the question of 
Spenser's influence ... I am led to consider the complicity of imagina-
tion in the construction of that fiction which is the "line" of Spenser 
and Milton. The adjacency of Shakespeare to this line has everything 
to do with the fortunes of fantasy, and by recognizing this fact, we 
should be able to recover a literary history less deformed by linear ge-
nealogy. (x) 
The genealogy Guillory means to recover is less linear than Bloom's in the 
sense that it includes figures other than poets-figures who still function as 
personifications of ideas, but who are drawn from "history" as well as po-
etry. Thus the explicit recognition of Galileo in Paradise Lost not only repre-
sents Milton's "failure to keep history wholly purged from his redaction of 
the biblical story" (156)-failure implying the will to do so, of course, which 
may come as a surprise to a great many of Milton's readers-but also reveals 
to us the surprising historical dimensions of literary history. As Guillory puts 
it, Milton's acknowledgment of failure in the inclusion of Galileo reminds us 
"that the psychomachia of literary history constitutes not only the genealogy 
of poets, but also, and more truly, the contest of literature and history" (xi). 
I 
! 
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Galileo, however, is only a coda to Guillory's central concern, just as his 
brief chapters on Spenser are a prelude to it. The central body of his book is 
devoted to Milton and the spectral figure of imagination that most preoccu-
pies him, namely Shakespeare. Milton, we are told, "displaced Shakespear-
ean drama into dramatic narratives of Protestant eschatology (turning blank 
verse into sacred epic)" (21-22). He apparently did so by echoing a single 
passage in many of his works: Theseus' speech on imagination in A Midsum-
mer Night's Dream, which is, for Guillory, the "most aggrandizing text on the 
imagination in the Renaissance." By "most aggrandizing" he means that it 
represents the idea of imagination most threatening to Milton, that of "a pre-
liminary decreation as a constituent of the act of creation" (20). This rather 
overburdened reading of "airy nothing," however, is a slight problem com-
pared to Guillory's notion that Theseus' speech represents "Shakespeare's 
'poetic,' very mediated indeed in the mouth of the unimaginative Theseus" 
(18). Removed from the context which serves not to "mediate" his comments 
but to reveal their limits, Theseus thus becomes Shakespeare's mouthpiece. 
Having ignored the fundamentals of dramatic context, Guillory then pro-
ceeds to ignore the fundamentals of dramatic form in his discussion of Co-
mus, where "Shakespeare" of course reappears. In order to avoid "the 
possible trivialization of a generic reading" (74), he discards genre altogether. 
Milton's Maske, we learn, is "a drama in the ordinary sense" (68). What 
"drama in the ordinary sense" might mean becomes clear: when Guillory tells 
us that "what Milton fears as perhaps too near him belongs to the great mi-
metic success of Renaissance literature, to its very illusionistic power, preemi-
nently to the drama and the drama's greatest poet" (138-39). The masque 
was indeed the province of illusionistic power in the Renaissance; drama was 
not, as Stephen Orgel has frequently reminded us' Guillory's blurring of dis-
tinctions, however, is not simply an effort to argue that Comus is, in a sense, 
dramatic;5 we are meant to take any sense of a "dramatic" structure in Mil-
ton's works, thus loosely understood, as a sort of echo or allusion to Shake-
speare. Poetic Authority is rich in examples of hyperbOlic generalization and 
willful disregard of contexts, literary or historical, but the most impressive in-
stance comes with Guillory's assertion that the final result of all this Miltonic 
wrestling with Shakespeare's ghost is to be found in Paradise Lost-which 
successfully killed off poetic drama in English literature: 
It is often said that Milton "killed" the epic in English literary history, 
but his greater victory was against the drama, the secular triumph of 
his native tradition. Great long poems continue to be written, but no 
great poet (with the exception of Milton himself in Samson Agonistes) 
would speak again in the form of the drama. In this overcoming Milton 
takes up both the blank verse medium, the Farian marble of Renais-
sance drama, and the allegorical play that was the seminal form of Par-
adise Lost. (139) 
This is not to say that no great poet will attempt a drama (Words-
worth's The Borderers is a fine exception), but rather that poetic drama 
is henceforth, inevitably, in the tradition of Samson Agonistes rather 
than Shakespeare. Poets tend to write closet drama while dramatists 
turn to prose. This seems to me much more astonishing than the sup-
posed decline of epic. (189 n.4G) 
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Oftentimes it is difficult to ascertain whether Guillory wants us to take his 
pronouncements at face value; the prose of Poetic Authority is at best difficult, 
managing to he at once excessively hyperbolic and oddly qualified in its as-
sertions ("The authority of imagination ... is almost never questioned by 
post-Renaissance critics"). This leads to a considerable blurring of necessary 
distinctions, and some doubts about what is being said. Thus, although Guil-
lory recognizes in a footnote that chastity is not equivalent to celibacy, his 
discussion of Comus equates the two throughout. We encounter a problem of 
a different order in his declaration that "the masque is the very genre in 
which we would least expect the triumphs of chastity, and the later Miltonic 
exercise (the 'mask of chastity') chastens the genre itself" (70-71). As a genre 
the masque is rather fond of chastity and its triumphs, as one might expect, 
considering that it was the preferred form of entertainment at wedding cele-
brations. Elsewhere, claims to originality are founded on sheer misreadings 
of other critics. Attempting to rescue the "neglected historicity of Paradise 
Lost" (145) from previous criticism, he quotes Joseph Wittreich supposedly 
dehistoricizing the poem. Wittreich's "prophetic Milton also denies repetition 
in history: 'For Milton, it is not especially important that history repeats itself 
but that, as Mark Twain once wrote, it rhymes, and through its rhymes holds 
out the possibility of progress'" (161). 
Poetic Authority is most successful, in contrast, when patient enough to 
give the work of others a serious and accurate reading. Thus the illiuminating 
interpretation of Colin Clout on Mt. Acidale, stemming from Guillory's care-
ful disagreement with Isabel MacCaffrey and Harry Berger; thus the use of 
Freud and Ricoeur to show, quite impressively, that "the pattern of Satanic 
behavior ... follows the genesis of melancholia, as Satan begins to imitate 
God, to become what he has lost, to introject" (115) divine authority. Such 
consideration is infrequent, however, and the result is that Poetic Authority 
suffers from an extreme disregard for both literary and historical contexts. 
III 
Self-Crowned Laureates: Spenser, Jonson, Milton and the Literary System 
grows out of Richard Helgerson's earlier study of the cultural situation of 
Renaissance poetry, The Elizabethan Prodigals. 6 In that work he considered 
the surprising frequency with which poets dismissed their own enterprise as 
unworthy, often as a prelude to renouncing poetry altogether. Revealing a 
fine sense of the ways in which poetic formulae can be both conventional 
and profoundly significant, he showed that such expressions of poetic dis-
dain, as in Sidney's renunciation of his corpus as "a trifle, and that triflingly 
handled," were not merely Elizabethan commonplaces, expressions of poetic 
sprezzatura cast in formulaic topoi of inconsequentiality. They were also a sig-
nificant register of the cultural moment and its ambivalence toward the role 
of the poet. Helgerson reformulates that ambivalence and its consequences 
for the "literary system" of Elizabethan England in his introduction to the 
present work: 
In an earlier study of the writers who dominated English literature in 
the 1580's-the decade that first thrust England toward the main-
stream of European Renaissance literature-I found the marks of an ex-
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traordinary and quite surprising uncertainty about the whole literary 
enterprise. These men had been taught by their fathers and schoolmas-
ters that poetry was wasteful folly and that folly inevitably led to re-
pentence. At first they rebelled against this iron law, but in the end 
they submitted and gave up writing, condemning all they had done as 
the outbreak of licentious youth. In doing so they were fitting their 
own literary activity to the commonplace definition of a poet as a 
young man culpably distracted from the real business of life. Obviously 
this self-image left no place for a fully developed poetic career. (17) 
Poetry was a transitional pastime: something to leave behind, not to found a 
career upon. Those who wrote professionally rather than as self-professed 
amateurs or prodigals did so for the stage-and it was not until Jonson's ef-
forts to dignify "plays" with the name of "Works" that English drama began 
to clear itself of the taint which, according to Sidney, caused "her mother 
Poesy's honesty to be called in question" (150). 
In Self-Crowned Laureates, "amateur" and "professional" comprise the first 
in a series of binary terms which, taken together, serve to define the "system 
of authorial roles" available to the Renaissance poet. Helgerson devotes 
much of his introduction and opening chapter to a detailed portrait of "the 
effect of this role definition on the shape of Elizabethan literature, on the 
choice of subjects and their treatment, and on the configuration of the typical 
literary career" (58-59). In turning his attention to Spenser, Jonson, and Mil-
ton, Helgerson is equally concerned with the formulae of literary self-pre-
sentation and their cultural determinants. Here, however, the fashioning and 
presentation of an authorial self is viewed not merely as a reflection or prod-
uct of a broader cultural situation, but also as a more dynamic device, a po-
tential means of producing new paradigms of poetic authority. The shift to a 
more dialectical model of cultural production is crucial, since Helgerson 
wishes to explain how a new paradigm, "an essentially new configuration of 
what Michel Foucault has called 'author-functions'" (3), came into existence 
within a literary system which seemed to have no place for it. Given the con-
straints imposed upon the poetic enterprise by a moral and cultural imagina-
tion that precluded a major literary career, how was it possible for poets of 
such "laureate" ambition, "who strove to achieve a major literary career and 
who said so" (1), to achieve even relative success? 
Helgerson's answer is an extended study of the dialectics of cultural 
change. Avoiding the overly broad concepts of period or episteme, he ap-
proaches each poet in terms of his own generation, defining a generation as a 
relatively synchronous cultural moment, "the temporal location in which a 
certain language is spoken" (19). For Helgerson, that language is never a 
merely poetic idiom, especially viewed from the perspective of laureate ambi-
tion. Since his self-crowned laureates (the fine irony of the title also reflects 
the ultimate impossibility of the task) sought to translate many of the ideals 
of civic Humanism into what was, by definition, a prodigal enterprise, their 
efforts to redefine the limits of poetic authority necessarily intersected the 
larger structures of authority; theirs was an effort to negotiate a new contract 
for poetry that was at once a social, political, and literary contract. To do so, 
each had to adopt the idiom of his time and adapt it to new purposes: each 
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had to be spoken through and thus be authorized by the collective cultural 
structure, and yet each had to speak in a way that made his words and works 
mean something new. It is in the examination of the individual careers that 
Helgerson's system of authorial roles receives its more detailed and precise 
exposition; the three chapters that form the heart of this book are not only 
studies of Spenser, Jonson, and Milton, but also comprehensive surveys of 
the limits and possibilities of meaning in the work of their contemporaries. 
And while this synchronic approach to the cultural idiom of each generation 
forms one axis of Self-Crowned Laureates, the effects of each generation on its 
successors forms the other, diachronic axis, producing what its author calls a 
"semiotic history," understood in the sense of Benveniste's "succession of 
synchronies."7 
The chapter on Spenser shares with the others a focus on critical moments 
of transition in each career; these include not only those "liminal" works 
which announce the New Poet but also the proems and prefaces of major 
and late works. Such "crossings of the threshold," in which the author fIrst 
appears before his audience or faces a new one, are the points at which the 
pressure to adopt a readily available authorial role is greatest, and with each 
new beginning comes "a renewal of self-presentational pressure" (13). In 
Spenser's efforts to combine the private inspiration of the love poet with vir-
tuous civic action through poetry, that pressure is apparent even in the trium-
phant fIrst intallment of The Faerie Queene, whose dedicatory epistle to Lord 
Burghley, shaped by the unsympathetic but considerable power of its addres-
see, slips back into the recantatory posture of the prodigal poet to present 
"The labor of lost time, and wit unstayd" (66). Since it is with Spenser that 
Helgerson most directly adumbrates his earlier work on the Elizabethan ama-
teur or prodigal, it should be said here that his readings of conventional ex-
pressions of poetic diffidence will strike many, albeit at different junctures, as 
being too literal-minded; the risk Helgerson runs with generations of critics 
weaned on Curtius is one he well recognizes, that of being thought a naive 
reader. However, his readings-especially, in this context, of The Shepheardes 
Calender-are finally convincing. Like E.K. (68), we seem to have been too 
qUick to cite Virgilian and other models, too ready to slight, in our recogni-
tion of the oft-announced Elizabethan desire for a major poet, the ideological, 
political. and literary pressures such a poet had to resolve-a resolution 
which Spenser, of course, ultimately failed to achieve. 
Spenser stands out from his contemporaries in two ways: first, in his public 
abandonment of all social identity except that conferred by his vocation (63), 
and second, in his efforts to achieve virtuous civic action through poetry. 
While he tries to make the second possible in The Shepheardes Calender by 
translating the coventional critique of the prodigal love-poet into a question 
of specifically poetic responsibilities neglected (71), the effort is troubled by 
"uncertainty about both the practical and moral implications of a poetic ca-
reer" (72). The love poet and the vatic poet momentarily cohere in the fIrst 
books of The Faerie Queene, but the later works of the 1590's have the "bifur-
cated look that we observe in the careers of his contemporaries" (88).8 The 
shattering reappearance of the Blatant Beast and the return to a pastoral and 
personal self of Colin Clouts Come Home Againe mark Spenser's retreat from a 
more public poetry, but even in retreat he stands out from his contemporaries 
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in his refusal to adopt the role of the prodigal. "Unlike the other poets of his 
generation, Spenser responds to such pressure not by renouncing, but rather 
by reaffirming, the value of poetry" (97). 
Jonson began his only pastoral poem at the end of his career, and never 
finished it; his announced epic, the Heroologia, remained a title without a 
poem as far as we know. Helgerson explains Jonson's inclusion in this book 
by recognizing his unquestionable poetic ambition and by suggesting that 
many of his generic choices, although explicitly violating the Virgil ian pattern 
of the "natural" laureate, were necessary for a generation of poets that in-
cluded Spenser among its antecedents. Although the argument for a diastolic 
pattern of achievement in successive literary generations (123-24) remains 
overly general, Helgerson's readings of Daniel and Drayton, as examples of 
the perhaps inevitable "hardening of generic distinctions" (100) which 
marked the efforts of those who took Spenser as a model, are persuasive. 
Equally convincing is this reading of Jonson's career and its pressure toward 
self-presentation and definition by difference; while complementing current 
readings of Jonson, Helgerson provides a rich new context for them. For Jon-
son's generation, satire and the increasingly profitable stage were lures few 
writers resisted; Jonson's efforts to use both as unlikely forums for presenting 
his own laureate claims set him significantly apart from his contemporaries. 
In the profusion of authorial selves that characterizes Every Man Out of His 
Humor, Helgerson locates Jonson's efforts to adapt the role of the satirist to 
the ends of laureate self-presentation; his imitation of Spenser is strategic 
rather than generic, for both "adopt the fashionable mode of their time only 
to criticize and partially detach themselves from it" (139). A similar detach-
ment is found in the anti-theatricalism that marks the middle plays from Vo/-
pone to Bartholomew Fair. In Volpol1e, Jonson "manages to have his plot 
without its having him," dissociating himself from it and making it "the re-
sponsibility of characters he can ultimately repudiate" (159). 
The view of Jonson's career as a whole, including the epigrams and the 
masques, is of "an agon, an unresolved struggle for the self against the very 
conditions of its expression" (184). It must be said, however, that the effort to 
explain all of Jonson's antithetical career in terms of "the conflict between 
laureate self-fashioning and satiric excess" (144) necessarily ignores Jonson's 
collaborative work-also marked by considerable excess, especially in the 
first years of Jacobean rule. When Jonson was /lot presenting himself, his sig-
nature of "satiric excess" is still apparent and not easily explained by the 
pressures of laureate self-presentation. 
It comes as a considerable surprise to be reminded, as we are at the open-
ing of Helgerson's long essay on Milton, of the poets who were Milton's rela-
tive contemporaries-those born between 1600 and 1618. The list forms a 
fairly comprehensive roster of the poets \\'ho were for the most part "content 
to remain admiring Sons of Ben, dutiful pupils in the School of Donne" 
(187). Part of the surprise, of course, stems from the length of Milton's career: 
its early and repeated announcements of precocious ability ("like the middle 
class, Milton is ahvays rising and never getting anywhere" [270] in the POCIIIS 
of 1645); the long hiatus at its center, during which Milton shifted his laure-
ate claims to the prose medium of the Defel1se of thc Ellglish Pcople; and the 
return to poetry under social, cultural, and political conditions which, as Hel-
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gerson argues, made necessary as well as possible a "poem that would ac-
knowledge no patron but God" (277). A part of that surprise, however, stems 
from Milton's eventual success in setting himself so fully apart from his con-
temporaries-a success which, as Helgerson brilliantly demonstrates, has 
given us the hindsight to misread the early work and overlook the degree to 
which it is "deeply engaged in the world of [Milton's] cavalier contemporar-
ies" (257). Helgerson traces that engagement quite thoroughly, providing a 
detailed view of what Milton's early work shared with "Orpheus' sons," as 
Davenant characterized the cavalier poets. While L'Allegro, 11 Penseroso, and 
Ad Patrem are marked by a typical cavalier emphasis on stylistic virtuosity-
Orpheus as a master of style and thereby an enforcer of civility-Lycidas ac-
knowledges what the cavaliers rarely do, the tragic fate of Orpheus. The im-
age of vulnerability and the questioning of the poetic enterprise it prompts 
are characteristic of Milton's efforts to speak "the literary language of his 
generation, but ... with an accent that reveals his laureate ambition" (268) 
-characteristic both in the effort to displace that language, and in the sheer 
negativity of the gesture. "A series of emergences, Milton's volume is also a 
series of deferrals" (270). 
The problem, Helgerson suggests, was not only the unsuitability of the 
Orphic idiom of the cavaliers or the presence of Charles on the throne. Both 
were of course obstacles to Milton's ambition, but both were also symptoms 
of a more fundamental contradiction: 
The very idea of a laureate poet harbored a contradiction that the pas-
sage of time made increasingly conspicuous. Yes, the laureate belonged 
by the monarch. But when placed there, he and his work seemed inev-
itably to decline toward mendacious flattery and triviality. Perhaps the 
true laureate could only be a poet of alienation and exile. (240) 
From the first Milton considered himself a divine poet, yet he saw no 
necessary opposition between God's ordinance and the order of the 
state. On the contrary, he, like Spenser and Jonson before him, saw the 
great poet as at once God's spokesman and the spokesman of national 
power. Nor did his increasing alienation from the established church 
and the royal government radically change that understanding. It sim-
ply meant that before he could assume his destined role there would 
have to be a new 'church and a new government. (242) 
Both the long-planned but never initiated Arthurian epic and the energy de-
voted to tracts written in service of the Commonwealth testify to Milton's de-
sire to see imagination and power, as Helgerson puts it, finally cohere. The 
central problem for the generation of Cowley, Davenant, and Milton, how-
ever, was "the problem of literary autonomy" (227); Cowley and Davenant 
freely gave it away, first to Charles I and later, during the Restoration, to the 
Royal Society in poems devoted to heroic scientific experiment-poems 
whose ultimate fate was to be collected in The Stuffed Owl (229). Only final 
and irremediable defeat, Helgerson argues, gave Milton the freedom to make 
"exile and alienation his subject and his stance," thereby resolving the inher-
ent contradiction of his generation in a fashion that made him seem entirely 
unrelated to it. "But if Paradise Lost finally stands alone," as Helgerson sug-
gests, "it stands alone as the unique solution to a shared problem" (251). 
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My summary can hardly do justice to the breadth of Self-Crowned Laureates 
or to the cogent and clear view of the Renaissance literary system that 
emerges as a result of that breadth. The transitional moments of each au-
thor's work are not merely considered as critical thresholds in the stages of a 
career. Rather, each liminal moment of transition serves Helgerson as a 
broader point of departure, an Ansatzpunkt (in Erich Auerbach's sense of the 
term)9 which provides an expansive opening into the work of a wide range of 
contemporaries and thus serves to articulate the limits and possiblities of 
meaning for each generation. Helgerson's is an effort to write literary history 
from a native's point of view, as it were, while clarifying the structures of au-
thority which conditioned the perspective and poetic practice of each succes-
sive generation. This bilinear charting of the Renaissance literary system 
ultimately serves as its author hoped it would: "to locate social and cultural 
constraints that do not appear on other maps and to discover significance in 
gestures that before seemed empty or odd" (15). As such, it is a significant 
contribution not only to literary studies but also to the larger "refiguration of 
social thought" taking place throughout the human sciences in recent years. 
Geertz's description of the increasingly interdisciplinary character of cultural 
interpretation in other fields could serve equally well to describe Self-
Crowned Laureates:10 
It is a phenomenon general enough and distinctive enough to suggest 
that what we are seeing is not just another redrawing of the cultural 
map-the moving of a few disputed borders, the marking of some 
more picturesque mountain lakes-but an alteration of the principles of 
mapping. Something is happening to the way we think about the way 
we think. 
What Geertz takes to be a significant cultural shift in the social sciences has 
been evident in recent Renaissance studies as well, as the field has begun to 
incorporate methodological and theoretical perspectives from the other hu-
man sciences, and to regard literary interpretation as a vehicle rather than an 
end, a way of gaining entry to a broader cultural field. Such developments 
have been alternately described as "a return to historical criticism" or as a 
"new historicism."ll However we characterize these endeavors, Self-Crowned 
Laureates contributes to them an illuminating and masterful study of the po-
etics of authority in Renaissance culture. 
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